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STATEMENT OF ISSUE

Is the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for retail theft?
Standard of Review. The present appeal is from a criminal bench trial.
Accordingly this Court reviews the District Court's factual determinations under a
clearly erroneous standard. See State v. Galll 967 P.2d 930,933 (Utah 1988).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
76-6-602. Retail theft, acts constituting.
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he
knowingly:
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or
causes to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise
displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile
establishment with the intention of retaining such merchandise or
with the intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the
possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying the
retail value of such merchandise; or
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag, marking,
indicia of value or any other markings which aid in determining
value of any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for
sale, in a retail mercantile establishment and attempts to
purchase such merchandise personally or in consort with another
at less than the retail value with the intention of depriving the
merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; or
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored or
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment from the
container in or on which such merchandise is displayed to any
other container with the intention of depriving the merchant of
the retail value of such merchandise; or
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of
the retail value of the merchandise; or
(5} Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail
mercantile establishment with the intent of depriving the
merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart.
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As more fully detailed in Argument 3 of the Argument section of this Brief,
Defendant's Statement of the Case suggests facts and makes assumptions that are
not in the record.
Charge. Defendant was charged with one count of retail theft, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-602. Appellant's Brief
Addendum A.
Conviction. Following a bench trial that lasted approximately one hour,
Defendant was convicted as charged. R52.
Sentence. A sentencing hearing was set for January 6, 2009 and a
presentence investigation report was ordered. R54-55. At sentencing the trial court
sentenced Defendant to 180 days in the Davis County Jail with 180 days suspended
and was placed on supervised probation for eighteen months. Defendant was also
ordered to pay a $350 fine, to pay restitution to Mervyn's in the amount of $124, to
take a cognitive restructuring class and to obtain a GED or high school diploma
before the end of Defendant's probation. Appellant's Brief Addendum C.
Timely Appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant's brief summarizes the evidence in the light most favorable to her
case and not the verdict of the trial court. It is well established appellate practice
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that this brief should recite the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict of the
trial court. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15 f 2.114 P.3d 551.
On March 14, 2008, Defendant and her mother visited the Mervyn's
department store in the Layton Hills Mall, Layton Utah. R40. While in Mervyn's
Defendant was observed viewing articles of clothing in a "High-Theft Storage Area"
of the store. R8. Closed circuit cameras are placed throughout Mervyn's. R9. Loss
Prevention Supervisor Anderson observed Defendant through the closed circuit
cameras, and at times, in person. R9 and 12. The area of the store in which
Defendant was observed is an area of focus for Mervyn's loss prevention officers
because it is an area in which retail thefts occur frequently. R8. Loss Prevention
Supervisor Anderson noted that Defendant was a high frequency retail theft area in
the store and that Defendant displayed behaviors and mannerisms that shoplifters
often display. R8-9. Notably, Defendant took items displayed for sale and draped
them over her arm and ripped at least one tag from the clothing. R9-10. While
doing this, she did a "look-around", or looked up at the ceiling. R8. Defendant then
took the items she had draped over her arm, including the item she had removed the
tag from, into the dressing room. Rll. Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson exited
the camera room and went into the dressing room where she observed Defendant
and another person, her mother, within the same changing stall in the dressing
room. R12-13. When Defendant exited the dressing room the items in her
possession were not visible however, she appeared to be wearing more than one
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shirt and her bag was larger than when she entered the dressing room. R14 and 16.
Before Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson could stop Defendant she was
required, per Mervyn's policy, to check the dressing room. R29-31. When Loss
Prevention Supervisor Anderson inspected the stall Defendant and her mother were
in she found only one item of clothing, some pants. R16-18. In the pocket of the
pants were numerous tags that had been removed from clothing that matched the
clothing that was taken into the dressing room by Defendant. R16-18. Becaise Loss
Prevention Supervisor Anderson was required to follow company policy and check
the dressing room before stopping a shoplifter, Defendant was able to abruptly
leave the store, enter her vehicle and leave. R17. By the time Loss Prevention
Supervisor Anderson caught up to Defendant in the parking lot, Defendant had
already got in her car and was driving away. Id. Loss Prevention Supervisor
Anderson noted the make, model and license plate of the vehicle Defendant drove
away in and relayed the information to the Layton Police Department. R17-18.
After some investigation, Layton City Police were able to determine the identity of
Defendant as Michelle Lee Spurgers. R36. Defendant was contacted by Layton
Police and questioned regarding the theft at Mervyn's. R36-37. Defendant denied
any involvement. R37.
On April 16, 2008 the Defendant was charged by criminal information in the
Second District Court, Layton Department with "Retail Theft", Utah Code §76-6-602.
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Appellants Brief Addendum A. On October 16, 2008 a bench trial was conducted in
which the Defendant was found guilty of violating §76-6-602 UCA. R52.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her
conviction for retail theft should be rejected for a number of reasons. First,
Defendant's brief is inadequate because she has not marshaled the evidence and has
failed to present the facts in a light most favorable to the verdict. Second, the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a guilty verdict And finally,
Defendant's brief asserts facts that are unsupported by the record.
Argument 1
THE DEFENDANT HAS NOT MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE AND HAS FAILED TO
PRESENT THE FACTS IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE VERDICT.
Defendant's brief is inadequate because she has failed to marshal the
evidence. To succeed on an insufficiency claim, Defendant must marshal all the
evidence and demonstrate that it fails to establish the elements of retail theft. Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 requires "A party challenging a fact finding must
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." The
marshaling process "serves the important function of reminding litigants and
appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial." State v.
Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990). Marshaling is an "arduous and
painstaking" process. West Valley v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah
App. 1991).
7

"To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel
must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves
from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In
order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
findings the appellant resists.'" ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage
and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051,1052-53 (Utah App. 1994)
(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah
App. 1991)).

In the instant case, Defendant claims to have met her burden of marshaling
the evidence. Defendant's marshaling of the evidence simply consists of a list of
witnesses called and the physical evidence admitted at trial. See Appellant's Brief'Pg.
11. It completely neglects to recite specific evidence presented at trial. Id. The
following is Defendant's attempt to marshal the evidence:
"The following is the marshaled evidence that supports the trial court's
finding that Ms. Spurgers was guilty of retail theft: (1) The testimony of
Teanna Anderson, Loss Prevention Supervisor for Mervyn's,
concerning her observation of Ms. Spurgers during the incident in
question; (See 10/16/08 Tr. Trans. 6-33; [sic] (2) The testimony of
Layton City Police Officer Chad Jones, concerning his investigation of
the case, including his telephone contact with Ms. Spurgers (See
10/16/08 Tr. Trans. 34-39); (3) The testimony of Ms. Spurgers
regarding the incident and her denial of taking anything (See 10/16/08
Tr. Trans. 39-45); (4) The trial exhibits admitted at trial, which
included a photo of similar items (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 -10/16/08
Tr. Trans. 34-39), a photo of tags allegedly found from missing items
(See Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 -10/16/08 Tr. Trans. 20-21); a bag of actual
tags allegedly from missing items (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 -10/16/08
Tr. Trans. 21-22); and (5) The store's video surveillance camera
recording of the alleged incident (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 -10/16/08
Tr. Trans. 1-22)" Id.
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Again, marshaling is an arduous and painstaking process in which "the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists." ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., at
1052-53.

By simply listing those who testified at trial and listing the trial

exhibits, Defendant has not undergone this "arduous and painstaking" process. See
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co. at 1315.
Even if the Court were to consider Defendant's Statement of Facts in her Brief
as her marshaling of the evidence it still inadequately recites the evidence
submitted at trial, particularly the testimonial evidence. The trial court relied upon
the testimony of all the witnesses in making reasonable inferences regarding
Defendant's behavior on the date in question. It was this testimonial evidence upon
which the trial court rendered a guilty verdict. For example, Defendant failed to
marshal any of Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson's testimony that while
shopping, Defendant did a "look-around" R8. That Defendant ripped the tag off of at
least one item of clothing. R5-6. That Mervyn's employees cleared the dressing
room of all clothing and other items immediately prior to Defendant entering the
dressing room. RIO. That Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson viewed Defendant
enter the dressing room with several items of clothing. Rll. That Loss Prevention
Supervisor Anderson confirmed that Defendant was in the dressing room and that
there was another person, her mother, in the dressing room stall with Defendant.
9

R12. That Defendant left dressing room with no items visibly her possession and
she and her mother's bags were larger than when they entered the dressing room
and that a second shirt was now visible under Defendant's shirt. R14 . That after
Defendant left the dressing room Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson checked the
dressing room and confirmed that only one of the numerous items were left in the
dressing room and the rest of the numerous items Defendant took into the dressing
room could not be located. R16-17. That Defendant left the dressing room quickly
and went straight for the door leading to the parking lot. Id. That Loss Prevention
Supervisor Anderson wanted to stop Defendant but couldn't until she checked the
dressing room per company policy. R32. And by the time she checked the dressing
room Defendant was already entering her car in the parking lot and she was not
able to stop Defendant for safety reasons and due to company policy. R32.
Accompanied with and corroborating Loss Prevention Supervisor's testimony
was a video confirming the events detailed in her testimony. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 4
- 10/16/08 Tr. Trans. 19:1-22). It is also important to note that instead of reciting
the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court's verdict,
Defendant argues the evidence in light most favorable to her acquittal.
Instead of marshaling the evidence, Defendant merely lists the witnesses who
testified at trial and the exhibits admitted at trial. This is not marshaling the
evidence.
Argument 2
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THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR
RETAIL THEFT.

Notwithstanding Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence, the evidence
presented at trial was more than sufficient to support a guilty verdict. As noted by
the Trial Court, there was no issue regarding identity, date, or location in the instant
case. R52. The only question in the present case is whether Defendant took
possession of, concealed or carried away or caused to be carried away or
transferred some merchandise for Mervyn's, the value of which was less than $300
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court correctly found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Defendant "did in fact take possession of, conceal, carry away
or cause to be carried away or transferred some merchandise from Mervyn's, at
least one item. And that value is less than $300." Id. In considering a sufficiency of
the evidence claim, this Court's inquiry is limited. See State v. Boss, 127 P.3d 1236.
(Utah App. 2005). "So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable
inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." Id. at 1238 (quoting State v. Mead, 27 P.3d
1115).
The trial court considered the following evidence at trial. The testimony of
Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson, the testimony of Layton Police Detective
Chad Jones, the testimony of Defendant, the surveillance video, some photos of tags
and clothing similar to the clothing taken, and the actual tags found in the dressing
room.
11

The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that the trial courts findings were
not clearly erroneous and that the inferences made were reasonable. Defendant
removed clothing from the display shelves and removed hangers from the clothing.
R8-16. Defendant did a "look-around". R8. Defendant removed a tag from at least
one item of clothing which is corroborated by the surveillance video and was
admitted by Defendant. R41, Plaintiffs Exhibit 4. Defendant entered the dressing
room with a substantial amount of clothing. Rll. Defendant was observed with
another person, her mother, inside a dressing room stall. R12-13. When Defendant
left the dressing room her bag was larger than when Defendant entered. R13-14
and 16. When Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson checked the dressing room
stall only one item of clothing was left in the stall and there were numerous tags left
behind that had been removed from the unaccounted for clothing items that
Defendant brought into the dressing room. R17-18. Defendant left the dressing
room with an additional shirt now protruding from the bottom of her shirt. R18.
Defendant admitted to having an additional "second" shirt on underneath her shirt
but claimed she wore it the whole time. R44. When Defendant left the dressing
room she immediately left the store, walked straight to her vehicle and drove away.
R17.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, it is clear that
the trial court's inferences were reasonable. As detailed in State v. Boss, there is
"some evidence" upon which inferences were reasonably made and the evidence is
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not "completely lacking or... so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict
plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, P 19, 999 P.2d 565, See
also State v. Boss. The trial court correctly found Defendant guilty of retail theft.
Argument 3
DEFENDANTS BRIEF CONTAINS ASSERTIONS THAT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE RECORD.
In considering Defendant's defects in marshaling the evidence and presenting
facts in a light most favorable to the verdict, it is important to note that Defendant
also makes assertions regarding Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson's testimony
and actions that are unsupported by the record. Defendant attempts to make
inferences that are clearly lacking and even contradicted in the record. For example,
in her brief, Defendant attempts to argue that the Loss Prevention Supervisor
Anderson was "unsure" of the theft and "refused" to detain Defendant. Appellant's
Brief Pg. 13. This is untrue and unsupported by the record. In her testimony Loss
Prevention Supervisor Anderson testified that she wanted to stop them but she had
to follow company policy before doing so. R17. This resulted in the loss of value
time to stop Defendant before she exited the store. Id. She stated, "I wanted to stop
them and ask them about the merchandise, if I could get it back." Id. She further
testified that she followed Defendant into the parking lot but couldn't stop her
because, "they weren't still walking. As I looked over they were getting in a car, and
so I got the license plate of the car." Id. Defendant further attempts to argue that
Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson had several opportunities to stop Defendant.
13

Appellant's Brief Pg. 13. At trial the loss prevention officer Anderson was asked if
there was a reason she did not immediately stop Defendant R31. Loss Prevention
Supervisor Anderson replied that she could not because she had to follow Mervyn's
policy before making a stop. Id. She responded, "Yes, there is. My company policy
states that I need to verify all of my steps. We had to have certain criteria and
certain steps before we go out on a stop, and one of them is checking the fitting
room." Id.
Another example of arguments asserted as facts not supported in the record
is Defendant's Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts which suggest that Loss
Prevention Supervisor Anderson "allowed" Defendant to leave and that "Ms.
Spurgers and her mother were allowed to leave the premises without being detained
in any manner by the merchant". Appellant's Brief Pgs. 2 and 4 (emphasis added).
The loss prevention officer clearly intended to stop Defendant but never had the
opportunity as Defendant left the store quickly and went directly to her vehicle.
R32.
In Defendant's Summary of the Arguments she again alleges that Loss
Prevention Supervisor Anderson "refused" to detain Defendant despite having
"several opportunities". Appellants Brief Pg. 7. And again this is contrary to the
testimony of Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson who clearly stated she was
simply following company policy by checking the dressing room before stopping
Defendant. R17.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons more fully set forth above, Plaintiff and Appellee respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the conviction of Defendant.

Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON R. DRAKE (11155)
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE
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